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Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
STANLEY LUCIDO, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20021018-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
& & & •& 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of Driving Under 
the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake 
City Code, Section 12.24.100, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Joseph W. Anderson and Judith S. Atherton 
presiding respectively. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78~2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether Lucido was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance 
of counsel at trial? A claim of ineffectiveness presents a mixed question of law and fact. 
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). Nonetheless, "ineffective assistance of 
counsel falls on the end of the spectrum subject to de novo review of the ultimate legal 
question of whether the defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment." State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah App. 
1995). 
To establish a claim of ineffective counsel, defendants must show: '\\) that his 
counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the 
outcome of the trial would probably have been different but for counsel's error." 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984); State v. Hunt, 781 P.2d 
473, 477 (Utah App. 1989). 
Appellant Lucido's argument that the blood evidence was obtained from him in 
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights was initially preserved at Court Record (R. 94) 
(Amended Motion to Suppress Blood Evidence And Memorandum in Support of 
Motion). This argument that the blood evidence was taken in violation of Lucido's 
Fourth Amendment Constitutional rights, however, was waived by trial counsel during 
closing argument at a suppression hearing on September 30, 2002, and trial counsel relied 
solely upon statutory grounds to support the motion to suppress blood evidence (R. 252 at 
34-35). Additionally, trial counsel did not renew said motion to suppress at trial and thus 
again waived the argument. This, Lucido asserts, constitutes ineffective assistance of 
counsel which prejudiced him. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional provisions and statutes are determinative of the issues 
on appeal. Their text is provided in full in Addendum B. 
United States Constitution Amendment IV - Search and Seizure; 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (Supp. 2001) - Utah's Implied Consent Law; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 14, 2000, Lucido was charged by Information with Count One, 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a Class A Misdemeanor and Count 
Two, Failure to Keep a Proper Look Out, an Infraction, (R. 2). Lucido entered pleas of 
not guilty on March 7, 2000 (R. 6 and 7). A jury trial date was subsequently set for May 
16, 2000 (R. 15 and 16). Upon the motion of Salt Lake City, the May 16, 2000 jury trial 
date was continued to September 29, 2000 (R. 21, 22, 23). On September 21, 2000, 
counsel for Lucido motioned to continue the trial date set for September 29, 2000 and 
said motion was granted and the jury trial was continued to November 28, 2000 (R. 27 
through 29). On November 28, 2000, because of Lucido5 s failure to appear, a warrant 
was issued for his arrest (R. 54 through 56). On December 29, 2000, counsel for Lucido 
filed a motion to recall bench warrant that was granted (R. 57 through 59). A subsequent 
jury trial date was set for February 27, 2001 which was continued upon motion filed by 
counsel for Lucido and a subsequent jury trial date was set for June 5, 2001 (R. 63 
through 69). Said jury trial date was subsequently rescheduled to July 13, 2001 (R. 71). 
On the 10th day of July, 2001, Salt Lake City made a motion to continue said jury trial 
date that was granted, and the jury trial was reset for August 29, 2001 (R. 78 through 80). 
On August 29, 2001, based upon a motion filed by the defense, said jury trial was 
continued to October 19, 2001 (R. 86). 
On October 15, 2001, counsel for Lucido filed a motion to suppress blood 
evidence taken in violation of Defendant's Fourth Amendment Rights (R. 87 through 91). 
On October 19, 2001, the jury trial was continued and a motion hearing scheduled for 
January 14, 2002 (R. 92 and 93). On November 13, 2001, counsel for Lucido filed an 
amended motion to suppress blood evidence and memorandum in support of motion (R. 
94 through 112). Salt Lake City filed memorandum in opposition to Defendant's motion 
to suppress evidence on January 9, 2002. On January 14, 2002, Defendant was not 
present and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest (R. 122 through 124). On 
September 30, 2002 the suppression hearing was held, during which defense counsel 
waived the Fourth Amendment argument as the basis for suppressing the blood evidence. 
The trial court denied Lucido's motion to suppress and a jury trial was scheduled for 
November 6th and 7th, 2002 (R. 135 and 136). Findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
order denying said motion to suppress were issued (R. 137 through 141). On October 23, 
2002, Lucido himself, acting without the consent or advice of counsel, filed a motion for 
mistrial and order for show of no confidence (R. 143 through 152). From the record it 
does not appear that these motions were ever addressed by the trial court. 
On November 6th and 7th, 2002, a jury trial was held in the matter, after which 
Lucido was convicted of both counts (R. 163 through 164; R. 216 through 218). Lucido 
was sentenced and a judgment and commitment was ordered on the same date of 
November 7, 2002. Lucido was sentenced to a term of 103 days and given credit for 103 
days previously served. A fine was imposed, but was suspended and Lucido was placed 
on supervised probation by probation services for 12 months (R. 216 through 218). On 
November 15, 2002, counsel for Lucido filed a motion for new trial which was 
subsequently denied (R. 228 and 229). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Testimony of Witness-Katielyn Conant 
Katielyn Conant, a registered nurse, was present at about 1350 South State Street 
on January 12, 2000 after she got off work between 4:00 and 4:30 (R. 253 at 42). She 
was driving about one car length behind a white truck (R. 253 at 42). Conant described 
the conditions as being still light and dark about one hour later, with the weather dry but 
cold and windy (R. 253 at 43). Conant observed the white truck parked cross ways 
across the lane at a red light and, when the light turned green, observed the white truck 
move into the intersection, swerve left and then back right into a parked car on the west 
side of the street (R. 253 at 44). The front end of the white truck hit the back end of the 
parked car (R. 253 at 44 through 45). Conant did not observe the driver of the white 
truck make any evasive moves, "it just happened so fast" (R. 253 at 45). Conant also did 
not remember or did not observe any brake lights illuminate onto the white truck or any 
skidding prior to the accident (R. 253 at 45). After the accident, Conant stopped her car, 
pulled over and went back to see if she could render any help as a nurse (R. 253 at 45). 
She found the driver of the white truck pretty much unconscious (R. 253 at 45). Conant 
positively identified Lucido as the driver of the truck (R. 253 at 45 and 46). Conant 
reached in a turned off the truck and held up Lucido's head. It was not held up on his 
own (R. 253 at 46). She also did not observe any obvious injuries (R. 253 at 46). She 
also did not observe any blood (R. 253 at 46 and 47). Conant testified that Lucido was 
mumbling, that he was really sweaty, and that she was trying to hold his head up in the 
truck and waited until the paramedics arrived (R. 253 at 49). Conant acknowledged that 
she did know whether or not the car that was hit was illegally parked (R. 253 at 55). 
Testimony of Witness-Bruce Healey 
Bruce Healey testified that he is a fire fighter/paramedic employed by the Salt Lake City 
Fire Department and was working in that capacity on January 12, 2000 (R. 253 at 58 and 
59). On that date, he was called to a traffic accident at about 13th South and State Street 
at approximately 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon (R. 253 at 60). He described the accident 
as a large pick up truck traveling southbound having struck several parked cars with quite 
a lot of resultant collision damage (R. 253 at 60). He further described the accident as a 
"significant mechanism" that he explained was a vehicle traveling at a fairly, to high rate 
of speed had struck parked cars and stated that the truck involved was pretty much half 
way on top of one of the cars (R. 253 at 61). When Healey arrived he secured the scene 
so he would not endanger any of the personnel responding and to prevent further injury to 
any patients involved (R. 253 at 61). Healey positively identified Lucido as the driver of 
the pick up truck whom he treated at the scene (R. 253 at 61). 
Healey described Lucido at the scene of the accident as semi-conscious, meaning he 
apparently was not responding to speech but that he did respond to painful stimuli (R. 
253 at 62). Healey recalled Lucido complaining of pain on the left side of his chest (R. 
253 at 62). Healey was assisting, with the extrication and the documentation, rather than 
the person who was chiefly responsible for the patient assessment and treatment (R. 253 
at 62). Healey stated that Lucido did not appear to have any injuries that would have 
rendered him unconscious (R. 253 at 63). He further testified that the air bags had 
deployed (R. 253 at 63). Healey testified that a cervical collar was placed on Lucido, that 
he was extricated from the vehicle and placed on a back board and put into the ambulance 
(R. 253 at 63). Healey further stated that the patient may have had some trauma to his 
left side and had some decreased breath sounds on his left side and that his pupils were 
constrictive and unreactive (R. 253 at 64). Healey observed that Lucido was wearing a 
duragesic patch on his shoulder (R. 253 at 64). Healey stated that he was concerned 
about the constricted and unreactive pupils because it is a physical finding that they 
observe consistently with some type of narcotic or opiate overdose (R. 253 at 65). 
Healey testified that the physical findings taken together, which included the decreased 
level of consciousness, the constricted and unreactive pupils and the presence of a 
duragesic patch on the patient led them to believe that the patient was under the influence 
(R. 253 at 65). Healey explained that they were carrying a drug known as Naloxone, 
more commonly known as Narcon, which is used to reverse the effects of a narcotic (R. 
253 at 65). Healey further explains that Narcon is used as both a treatment to reverse the 
effects of a narcotic and as a diagnostic tool to determine the cause of the patient's state 
(R. 253 at 65 and 66). Healey further explained that when you administer Narcon, it is a 
relatively fast acting drug and that you see a change in pupil size and the patience level of 
consciousness improves (R. 253 at 66). Healey testified that when the drug Narcon was 
administered to Lucido, that he began communicating with them, talking with them, and 
became combative (R. 253 at 66). Healey testified that this reaction on the part of Lucido 
was consistent with their prior experiences with narcotic overdoses (R. 253 at 66 and 67). 
Healey testified that after the Narcon was administered to Lucido he became 
combative, he tore out his IV line, he spit on Healey's partner, and that they had to sort of 
restrain him (R. 253 at 67). When they arrived at the hospital, they continued to restrain 
him and delivered him to the medical doctors and nurses. Healey further testifies that 
several hours after taking Lucido to the hospital, he was dispatched on another call with 
an ambulance to the patient, Lucido, who was found wandering somewhere in the City, 
and the police sent him to the hospital for an evaluation (R. 253 at 67 and 68). At this 
point, defense counsel objected to the line of questioning and it was stopped (R. 253 at 
68). 
During cross examination Healey testified that Lucido was initially unresponsive 
to speech, required pain stimulus and that subsequently, as time went by, he became more 
responsive, obeying commands (R. 253 at 70). Healey testified that he is aware that air 
bags deployed at an extremely rapid speed and that the deployment of an air bag can 
alone cause injury and even deadly injury (R. 253 at 72 and 73). Healey also 
acknowledged that constricted pupils can be a sign of a concussion (R. 253 at 73 and 74). 
Healey further testified that administering Narcon to someone who does not have any 
opiates in their system, has no effect. Healey indicated that there was some confusion in 
Lucido's speech response but acknowledged that this is sometime common in dramatic 
accidents when people are hit in the head, and that quite often there is no implication of 
drugs or alcohol in those accidents, and that it is just a response to the impact of two 
vehicles (R. 253 at 76 and 77). 
Testimony of Witness- Officer Robin Snyder 
Officer Robin Snyder testified that she works for the Salt Lake City Police 
Department and was deployed in that capacity on January 12? 2000 when she was called 
to investigate a traffic accident at about 1300 South and State Street at approximately 
4:00 to 4:30 p.m. (R. 253 at 80). When she arrived on the scene, she observed a white 
Dodge truck that had crashed into a car in the far right-hand lane (R. 253 at 81). Officer 
Snyder observed no skid marks at the scene (R. 253 at 81). She further testified that the 
weather was clear and that it was day time (R. 253 at 82). Officer Snyder testified that 
she got there a little late, and the paramedics were putting Lucido into an ambulance, so 
she stayed there and investigated the scene, after which she responded to the hospital (R. 
253 at 85). 
Officer Snyder testified that during her investigation she obtained information 
about the owner of the truck in the glove compartment showing it was registered to 
Lucido (R. 253 at 86 and 87). Officer Snyder testified that she had Lucido's driver's 
license but that she never personally spoke to Lucido and she did not remember if she 
obtained it at the scene or at the hospital (R. 253 at 87). When Officer Snyder anived at 
the hospital, she was directed to the driver of the vehicle who she was told was in 
restraints at that point (R. 253 at 88). She went to his bed where she observed a mask 
over Lucido's mouth to prevent him from spitting on doctors and personnel, and she 
observed that he was actually restrained in a bed with an IV in his arm (R. 253 at 88). 
Officer Snyder testified that she read Lucido the DUI admonitions regarding breath 
and/or blood tests and that his response was growling, kind of yelling, clenching knuckles 
and stuff, and that she did not know if Lucido heard her or not (R. 253 at 89). Officer 
Snyder further testified that she did not believe Lucido was aware of his surroundings (R. 
253 at 90). Officer Snyder continued to try to talk to Lucido and stated that he was 
making lots of sounds and squirming around and that she kept trying to talk louder, and 
kept thinking he would hear her and that she did not know if he knew she was standing 
there talking to him (R. 253 at 90). Officer Snyder further advised Lucido that he was 
under arrest for DUI but stated that at the time she did not think he understood (R. 253 at 
90). Officer Snyder then called out a blood tech to do a blood draw (R. 253 at 91). 
Officer Snyder observed the blood draw from Lucido that occurred about 6:30 p.m. (R. 
253 at 91). 
Under cross examination, Officer Snyder acknowledged that because of the angle 
of the collision, off to the side, that the driver may have taken some evasive action (R. 
253 at 94). Officer Snyder further acknowledged that State Street had an excessive 
amount of traffic during the time of the accident and that the Ford Sedan that was hit was 
parked in a no parking area (R. 253 at 99). Under cross examination, Officer Snyder was 
asked if she knew the results of the blood test, to which she stated that she did not but had 
heard that there was some heroin but that she was not really sure (R. 253 at 104 and 105). 
Testimony of Witness- Officer Kale Lennberg 
Kale Lennberg is a police officer with Salt Lake City and was employed in that 
capacity on January 12, 200 when he was called to investigate a traffic accident (R. 253 
at 106). The accident occurred just south of 13th South and State Street in the afternoon 
and involved a Dodge truck that had rear ended another vehicle in the outside lane (R. 
253 at 107). In addition to acting as a regular officer, officer Lennberg was there on that 
date in the capacity of a field training officer for Officer Synder (R. 253 at 107). Officer 
Lennberg observed a lot of damage to the vehicle that was parked and observed that it 
looked like the truck had struck the vehicle at quite a high rate of speed (R. 253 at 107). 
At some point Officer Lennberg responded to the hospital after receiving a report that the 
person involved in the crash had been administered some Narcon and that it might be an 
overdose or some sort of DUI situation (R. 253 at 108). When he arrived at the hospital, 
he spoke to the driver whom he positively identified in court as Lucido (R. 253 at 108). 
Officer Lemiberg described Lucido on a gurney as just kind of gurgling, moaning and 
kind of growling (R. 253 at 108 and 109). At some point Officer Lennberg testified that 
he and Officer Snyder had reached a conclusion, after speaking with hospital personnel, 
that Lucido was under the influence of probably the patch he was wearing (R. 253 at 109 
and 110). 
During cross examination, Officer Lennberg acknowledged that the traffic 
accident itself did not indicate to him that it was necessary DUI related but it was only 
after he received information over the radio that he understood it may be DUI related (R. 
253 at 110 and 111). Officer Lennberg also acknowledged that he has seen a number of 
rear end accidents and that such accidents may be caused by many reasons including 
excessive speed, improper look out and driver distraction (R. 253 at 113). 
Testimony of Witness-Brian Davis 
Mr. Davis owns a company that supports law enforcement for the collection of 
forensic blood samples and is one of the technicians that goes out and draws blood 
samples (R. 253 at 116). On January 12, 2000, Davis had the occasion to draw blood 
from Lucido (R. 253 at 117). When he arrived at the hospital he met up with two officers 
who pointed out the person he was to draw blood from (R. 253 at 117). Davis positively 
identified that person as Lucido (R. 253 at 117 and 118). Davis stated that there was at 
least one member of the nurse staff and the two officers present when he drew the blood 
but that he did not remember speaking with the Defendant (R. 253 at 118). Davis 
described Lucido's demeanor as slow and lethargic, slow to answer questions, difficult to 
understand him . . . seemed kind of in and out of awareness, not really conscious (R. 253 
at 118). Davis said that he drew the blood from Lucido, put it in an envelope and sealed 
it, stored the envelope at his home until he took it to the state lab on January 17, 2000 at 
2:30 p.m. (R. 253 at 120 through 122). 
During cross examination, Davis described Lucido's condition as halting speech, 
slow deliberate conversation, and that he was present when Lucido wras talking to other 
people in the room (R. 253 at 123). Davis also noted that he did not observe any violent 
behavior on Lucido's behalf but that he may have been in restraints (R. 253 at 124). 
Testimony of Witness- Susan Rasmussen 
Susan Rasmussen is a forensic toxicologist for the Utah Department of Health, 
Law Enforcement Toxicology Section. She analyzes blood and urine samples for Ethel 
alcohol and drug content and gives expert testimony on the person's ability or inability to 
drive (R. 253 at 126). Rasmussen testified that she saw what was marked as City's 
Exhibit 7, 8 and 9 in the laboratory in February of 2000 and that she received them sealed 
(R. 253 at 128). Rasmussen performed a chemical test to determine the drug content in 
this case and testified that the name on the viles is Stanley K. Lucido (R. 253 at 129). 
Rasmussen first tested for alcohol which returned negative (R. 253 at 130). Rasmussen 
testified that she confirmed in Lucido's blood sample, Martazapine of .04 micrograms per 
milliliter, Diazepam, which is Valium of 1.1 micrograms per milliliter, Nordiazepan, 
which is Valium metabolite greater than one microgram per milliliter, Hydrocodone, 
which is commonly known as Lortab at .1 micrograms per milliliter and Temazepam at .3 
micrograms per milliliter and that the Temazapam more than likely a metabolite of the 
Valium (R. 253 at 132). Rasmussen testified that Martazapine is an anti-depressive and 
generally does not cause impairment (R. 253 at 132). Rasmussen testified that Diazepam 
is Valium, that it is a tranquilizer and that it is known to cause impairment (R. 253 at 
133). She also testified that the level found in Lucido was a little high for therapeutic and 
that the effect of the drug is a central nervous system depressant and as such, impairs 
reaction time (R. 253 at 133). Rasmussen further testified that the level of Nordiazepan, 
a metabolite of Diazepam, was over one microgram, which put it in a very high 
therapeutic range (R. 253 at 133 and 134). Rasmussen testified that Hydrocodone is a 
synthetic opiate with a brand name Lortab and that the level of. 1 micrograms per 
milliliter is above therapeutic level (R. 253 at 134). Rasmussen stated that the effects of 
Lortab is also a central nervous system depressant and that it does cause impairment (R. 
253 at 134). 
Rasmussen stated that each of these drugs individually are known to cause 
impairment, that they are all central nervous system depressants and that the combination 
of the four was going to increase the potential for impairment (R. 253 at 135). 
Rasmussen stated that she could not say whether Lucido was impaired because an 
individual can establish tolerance to these drugs but that she would be surprised if 
someone with these drugs in their system was not impaired (R. 253 at 135). Rasmussen 
further testified that if someone had a head injury and was unconscious due to the injury 
that Narcon would have no effect upon that person (R. 253 at 137). 
During cross examination Rasmussen acknowledged that only prescription drugs 
were found in Lucido's blood sample (R. 253 at 137). Rasmussen also repeated that a 
person can build a tolerance to these drugs and that the longer a person takes the drugs, 
the more likely he is to build a tolerance (R. 253 at 138). Rasmussen further recognized 
that if a person had been on the drugs for a long period of time that they would need to 
take more to achieve the same therapeutic effect (R. 253 at 138). Rasmussen also 
acknowledged that a person taking said drugs individually would not necessarily be 
impaired (R. 253 at 139 and 140). 
During redirect examination, Rasmussen testified that in a hypothetical in an 
individual who had a severe accident with this particular combination of drugs on board 
as Lucido had, that it would be her belief that the drugs were a definite factor in the cause 
of the accident (R. 253 at 143). 
During re-cross examination, Rasmussen testified that the drugs were definitely a 
factor in the accident and that even given a high level of tolerance, given the high level of 
Hydrocodone, that it was approaching a toxic level instead of simply a therapeutic one 
(R. 253 at 144). 
Testimony of Witness-Stanley Lucido 
Lucido testified that he remembered the events of January 12 of the year 2000 and 
that they were 98% clear in his mind but that there were some periods during the evening 
that were fuzzy (R. 253 at 147). Mr. Lucido testified that at the age of 15, because of a 
rodeo accident, that he began using Demorol and that he was on said drug for 8 or 9 
months at which time it was switched to Darvon and then to Darvicet (R. 253 at 148). He 
further testified that he has had numerous back injuries, the most recent was when he 
broke most of his entire thoracic spine T3 through T12 due to advanced Osteoporous (R. 
253 at 148). He also testified that he has Avascular Necrosis in the left shoulder and 
Osteonecrosis in the right shoulder and that his right shoulder has been broken and all of 
the ribs down his back have been broken in rodeos and his entire left chest has been 
crushed 11 times in addition to several other bone injuries and others (R. 253 at 148 and 
149). Lucido testified that he has been on pain killers since the age of 15 except for 
approximately a year or a year and half at a time (R. 253 at 150). Lucido further testified 
that he is under the care of a team of physicians up at the VA hospital, and that he is 
going through a pain management program and that he is on a surgical waiting list to 
repair some of the damage he has (R. 253 at 150). 
Lucido testified that over the years his dosage of medication has increased (R. 253 
at 150 through 151). He further testified that the levels of medication that he was taking 
on the 12th of January was considerably higher than what he would have been taking 
years before (R. 253 at 150 and 151). Lucido testified that the increased dosages did not 
effect his ability to drive but that it changed the pain from a very sharp stabbing pain to a 
dull pain and that he drove for a number of years on various medications after having 
determined that there was no impairment (R. 253 at 152). Lucido testified that he did not 
find any impairment in relation to the drugs he was taking on the 12th of January of 2000 
and that he had not taken anything since about 3:00 o'clock that morning. He testified 
that he did have a Fentanyl Patch on that made him light headed or dizzy but that he 
could still bend over and pick up stuff and that he never wobbled or swayed or slurred his 
speech (R. 253 at 153). 
Lucido testified that he was driving south on State Street, that he was in a lot of 
pain, that he accelerated through a green light and at the time was checking his mirror for 
police because he was speeding, and when looked back up there was a stopped car in 
front of him. He was also moving some things in his car so that he would see clearly (R 
253 at 154 and 155). He further testifies that he remembers that he jumped back to hit 
the breaks and tried to turn the wheel but then he remembers rolling off what he thought 
wras a white burlap bag (R. 253 at 155). Lucido identified City's Exhibit 3, the items that 
he was moving out of the way before he struck the parked car (R. 253 at 155 and 156). 
Lucido also identified in City's Exhibit 2, skid marks that he identified as where his tire 
hit the driver's right rear corner of the Ford Tempo (R. 253 at 156 and 157). Lucido 
testified that he does not remember anything until after rolling off the bag until he was in 
the ambulance (R. 253 at 157). Next he remembers hearing a voice; someone telling him 
to move his arms and legs and squeeze their fingers; he thought they said he was in a 
rodeo accident; and then he remembers being asked questions about his medical history 
and did it hurt and where did it hurt (R. 253 at 158). After that, Lucido remembers 
opening his eyes and at first he thought he was in a walk-in refrigerator at a restaurant 
and that they were trying to beat him up and he started to fight back and he did not 
remember anything from that point until he woke up in the hospital and his hands were 
strapped down (R. 253 at 158). Lucido did remember having a needle stuck in his arm 
and perhaps an IV while he was in the ambulance (R. 253 at 159). At the hospital, 
Lucido remembers 5 or 6 people standing over him fighting with him trying to strap him 
down around the waist and chest and hands and does not recall ever spitting on someone 
(R. 253 at 159). Lucido next recalls that both his hands were strapped down, he was still 
on the examiner table and that he had a catheter in him and that he yelled for an orderly 
and that a man in hospital scrubs came in (R. 253 at 159). At that point Lucido 
demanded to be released and refused medical treatment (R. 253 at 159 and 160). During 
cross examination when the City asked Lucido in his opinion he did not believe any of 
the drugs that he took impaired him. He responded that "No some of them do" (R. 253 at 
161 and 162). However under redirect examination, when asked whether he believed any 
of the drugs that he was taking at the time of the accident or that he had in his system at 
the time of the accident had impaired him, Lucido responded no (R. 253 at 162). Lucido 
further testified that there are times he will not drive when taking certain drugs but that 
the ones found in his system on the date of the accident he had been taking for a while 
and that he had never noticed any impairment, and that he had been on said drugs for 
years (R. 253 at 162). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Lucido was denied his Sixth Amendment right to competent trial counsel v^hen his 
trial counsel waived the argument, both at suppression hearing and at trial, that blood 
evidence was taken from him in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. The admission of said blood-evidence and expert 
testimony regarding it prejudiced Lucido such that there is a reasonable probability that if 
it had been excluded the outcome of the trial would have been different. 
ARGUMENT 
L TRIAL COUNSEL'S DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE IN WAIVING 
THE ARGUMENT THAT THE BLOOD EVIDENCE TAKEN FROM 
LUCIDO WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF HIS FOURTH 
AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO BE FREE FROM 
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES AND THUS 
SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL THAT PREJUDICED LUCIDO 
Lucido asserts that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel when his trial counsel waived the argument, both at a suppression 
hearing and trial in the matter, that the blood evidence obtained by police was taken in 
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures and thus should be suppressed. 
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, 'it is the Defendant's burden 
to show: (1) that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable 
manner, and (2) that the outcome of the trial would probably have been different but for 
counsel's error." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674 (1984); accord State v. Hunt, 781 P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App. 1989). 
A. The Performance of Lucido's Trial Counsel Fell Below an Objective 
Standard of Reasonableness. 
"In order to bring a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim, appellant 
must show that his trial counsel's performance was deficient, in that 'it fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness/ and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
outcome of the trial.'" State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah 1998) (quoting State v. 
Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 635 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687-88, 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)); accord State v. 
Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah App. 1993). 
To meet this prong, defendants "must prove specific, identified acts or omissions 
fall outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." State v. Frame, 723 
P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
First, Lucido asserts that his trial counsel's waiver of the argument, that the taking 
of his blood sample constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of his 
Fourth Amendment rights, fell below an objective standard of reasonableness (R. 252 at 
34-35). Trial counsel originally argued in the written Amended Motion to Suppress 
Blood Evidence and Memorandum in Support of Motion, that the blood evidence 
obtained from Lucido was taken in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights (R. 94-
112). Trial counsel later waived this argument near the end of a suppression hearing in 
the matter and did not renew it at trial, thus waiving it again. (R. 252 at 34-35). This 
argument, however, was very similar to the successful argument made by counsel for 
appellant in State v. Rodriguez, 501 Utah Adv. Rep. 8. 
In Rodriquez, the defendant was involved in an automobile accident as the driver 
of a vehicle that collided with a school bus. Id. at P.2. Paramedics arriving at the scene 
determined that Rodriquez was in critical condition and transported her to LDS Hospital. 
Id. The paramedics also determined that the passenger had severe head injuries and was 
near death, likely to die, and transported her to the University Hospital. Id. About that 
point, the first of the responding officers arrived on the scene to examine it and look for 
possible witnesses. Id. at P. 2, 3. The officers were approached by someone who 
appeared to be a paramedic that told them that the occupants of Rodriguez's car smelled 
of alcohol Id. When the officers looked in Rodriguez's car they found a purse, which 
turned out to be the passenger's, which contained an open, partially empty bottle of 
vodka. Id. Soon thereafter, the supervising officer arrived, was informed of the 
circumstances surrounding the accident, the paramedic's observations, and the partially 
empty bottle of vodka found in the car, and he immediately requested that dispatch send 
an officer to obtain a blood sample from Rodriguez. Id. 
At 5:10, no more than twenty-five minutes after the accident occurred, dispatch 
instructed an officer to locate the driver and witness a blood draw. Id. at P. 4. The 
officer first drove to the University Hospital where he learned that Rodriquez was at the 
other hospital, LDS Hospital. The officer then drove to LDS Hospital where he was 
directed to the CT room where Rodriquez was lying on a CT table waiting for a CT scan. 
Id. Pie noticed that she was being very uncooperative with the medical staff and that her 
breath had a heavy odor of alcohol. He also noticed that her eyes were red and that his 
speech was slurred and described Rodriquez in general terms as "uncooperative," "very 
angry," and "belligerent." Id. Upon locating Rodriquez, the officer asked her some 
questions but found her to be uncooperative. Id. at P.5. He then waited twenty-five 
minutes for the blood draw technician to arrive. Id. When the technician arrived, the 
officer informed Rodriguez they "were going to draw blood from her just as we do in 
accidents." Id. The technician drew blood from an IV line that had been inserted into 
Rodriquez5 s arm and the subsequent tests on the blood revealed that Rodriquez's blood 
alcohol level was .39. Id. 
The passenger died and Rodriquez was charged with one count of automobile 
homicide. Id. at P. 6. Rodriquez filed a motion to suppress any evidence derived from 
the warrantless blood draw, which the trial initially granted. Id. After the State 
petitioned for relief, however, the trial court reconsidered and denied the motion. Id. On 
appeal Rodriguez argued that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress all the evidence 
that resulted from the warrantless blood draw, because the State failed (1) to demonstrate 
that the officer had probable cause to believe she had committed an alcohol related 
offense, and (2) to show that the extraction was justified by exigent circumstances. Id. at 
P. 7. 
This Court stated in the Rodriguez decision, that "[t]o justify a police officer's 
decision to extract blood without the benefit of a search warrant, the State bears the 
burden of showing that (1) the officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant 
was involved in an alcohol-related offense; (2) the officer had reason to believe the blood 
sample would produce evidence of the defendant's level of intoxication when the crime 
was committed; (3) the officer reasonably believed that they were "confronted with an 
emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, 
threatened 'the destruction of the evidence,'"; and (4) the method used by the officer to 
obtain the blood sample was "performed in a reasonable manner." Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1836-37 (1966)(citation omitted); see 
also City ofOrern v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1190, 1388 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (stating "the 
[State] bears the burden of showing both probable cause and exigent circumstances"). 
Rodriguez, 501 Utah Adv. Rep. At 9, P. 9. This Court reversed Rodriguez's conviction 
and remanded with instructions to suppress all evidence derived from the warrantless 
blood draw because it found that under the circumstances, the State had failed to meet its 
burden of exigency. Id. at P. 22. Because this Court found the question of exigency to be 
dispositive, the issue of probable cause was not addressed. Id. at P. 9. 
The facts in Lucido's case are substantially similar to those in Rodriguez. Lucido, 
like Rodriguez, was involved in an automobile accident and transported to a hospital for 
medical treatment/evaluation. (R. 252 at 5-6, 16-17; 253 at 63, 67, 85). Also like 
Rodriguez, the officers in Lucido's case learned from third party witnesses that they 
suspected the driver of driving under the influence because of their various observations. 
(R. 252 at 5-6, 16-17; 253 at 87-88, 90, 108-10) In response to such information, 
officers in both cases decided that a blood draw needed to be taken from the driver at the 
hospital. (R. 252 at 9, 11, 17-19; 253 at 87-88, 90, 108-10) In both cases the drivers 
were found to be uncooperative and/or belligerent and/or combative. (R. 252 at 11-12, 
17, 19, 24-26, 28; 253 at 88-89, 108-109) Finally, similar to the officers in Rodriquez, 
the officers in Lucido's case did not testify of securing nor even attempting to secure a 
warrant to obtain said evidence, even though the decision to extract Lucido's blood "was 
made soon after the accident occurred, at a time 'when courts are open and search 
warrants can be readily requested5 either in person or by telephone." Rodriquez, 501 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 11, P. 19 (quoting State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1292 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988)1 
One difference between the two cases is that Rodriguez was suspected of driving 
under the influence of alcohol, and Lucido was charged with driving under the influence 
of drugs. This Court in Rodriguez stated that "[t]he evanescent nature of blood-alcohol 
evidence does not, per se, convert every alcohol-related blood draw into an emergency. 
Without some reasonable belief that the steady dissipation of blood-alcohol constitutes an 
emergency under the particular circumstances, a warrant must be obtained." Rodriguez, 
501 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, P. 21. It is arguable that there is even less of a case for exigency 
in Lucido's case than there was in Rodriguez as the latter involved blood-alcohol levels 
as opposed to blood-drug levels which arguably remain present in the blood longer than 
alcohol. 
The City may maintain that U.C.A. § 41-6-44.10, which reads in pertinent part, 
(l)(a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is 
considered to have given his consent to a chemical test or 
tests of his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of 
determining whether he was operating or in actual physical 
1 The accident in the Rodriguez case occurred between 4:45 and 4:50 pm and the decision to draw the defendant's 
blood no more than twenty-five minutes later at 5:10 pm (Rodriquez* 501 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9. P. 2. 4). The 
accident in Lucido's case occurred between 4:00 and 4:30 pm (R. 353 at 42; 60: 80) 
control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited . . . if the test is or tests 
are administered at the direction of a peace officer having 
grounds to believe that person to have been operating or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a 
blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited .. . 
(2)(a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then 
been requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or 
more of the chemical tests under Subsection (1), and refuses 
to submit to any chemical test requested, the person shall be 
warned by the peace officer requesting the test or tests that a 
refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in revocation of 
the person's license to operate a motor vehicle. 
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other 
condition rendering him incapable of refusal to submit to any 
chemical test or tests is considered to not have withdrawn the 
consent provided in subsection (1), and the test or tests may 
be administered whether the person has been arrested or not. 
authorized the officers to take Lucido's blood because the trial court found Lucido 
incapable of refusing or withdrawing consent to the tests. (R. 137-41). Lucido would 
disagree. First, U.C.A. § 41-6-44.5(1 )(b) makes clear that "[e]vidence of a defendant's 
blood or breath alcohol content or drug content is admissible except when prohibited by 
Rules of Evidence or the constitution." (emphasis added). Lucido asserts, as did the 
defendant in Rodriguez, that the blood evidence obtained by the police is inadmissible 
because it was taken in violation of his Fourth Amendment constitutional rights. 
Second, the defendant in Rodriguez was described as "uncooperative," "very 
angry," and "belligerent." Rodriguez, 501 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8 P. 4-5. Although it 
doesn't appear from the opinion that the trial court in Rodriguez made any determination 
or finding of the defendant's ability or lack thereof to consent or withdraw consent, as 
was the case with Lucido where the trial court found Lucido Vs as incapable of refusing or 
withdrawing consent (R. 137-41), the descriptions of the respective defendants are 
similar, and Lucido asserts that, regardless, an incapacitated individual should the same 
Fourth Amendment interests in remaining free from unreasonable searches and seizures 
as does any individual. If anything, an incapacitated person has an even greater need for 
the protections of the warrant requirement to ensure the search and/or resultant seizure 
comport with the Fourth Amendment safeguards that probable cause exists as determined 
by a neutral magistrate. 
In total, with all the similarities between the facts of Rodriguez and the case at 
hand, if an exigency did not exist in Rodriguez, where driving under of alcohol was at 
issue, then there is even less of an exigency in the case of Lucido where driving under the 
influence of a drugs is the issue. Therefore, like defense counsel in Rodriguez, Lucido's 
defense counsel should have maintained and not waived the effective argument that blood 
evidence was taken in violation of Lucido's Fourth Amendment rights and thus not 
admissible. In waiving said argument, both at the suppression hearing and at trial, 
Lucido asserts that defense counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. 
1. There was no tactical purpose for abandoning the argument that Lucido's 
Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the taking of the blood evidence and 
thus should be suppressed 
The Supreme Court has also made clear that "before we will reverse a conviction 
based on ineffective assistance of counsel, we must be persuaded that there was a 'lack of 
any conceivable tactical basis' for counsel's actions." Bryant, 965 P.2d at 542 (quoting 
State v. Moritzsky, 111 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989)). Lucido asserts that there was 
no conceivable tactical basis for his counsel's actions in waiving the Fourth Amendment 
suppression argument. Although Lucido's trial counsel continued to press for 
suppression of the blood evidence on statutory grounds, as evidenced above in the 
Rodriguez case, with substantially similar facts, trial counsel should have also maintained 
the effective argument that the blood evidence was taken in violation of Lucido's Fourth 
Amendment rights. The two arguments are not mutually exclusive and could and should 
have been maintained in the alternative to one another. Failure to do so on trial counsel's 
part constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. 
B. Lucido was Prejudiced by his Trial Counsel's Deficient Performance. 
The second prong of the Strickland test is satisfied only by showing there is a 
reasonable probability that ubut for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different." Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. Lucido asserts that had trial counsel not 
waived the Fourth Amendment arguments to suppress the blood-evidence, and had said 
evidence been suppressed and not introduced at his trial, there is a reasonable probability 
that the jury would not have found him guilty of Driving Under the Influence of Drugs. 
At trial the City, through the testimony of Susan Rasmussen, introduced the results 
of the blood-draw taken from Lucido as City's Exhibits 10 and 11, as well as extremely 
damaging expert testimony regarding said results. The results and testimony revealed 
that Lucido had in his blood diazepam, which is Valium, at a level of 1.1 micrograms per 
mil, nordiazepam, which is the Valium metabolite greater than one microgram per mil, 
hydrocodone, which is commonly known as Lortab, at 0.1 microgram per mil, and 
temazepam at 0.3 micrograms per mil, which is more than likely also a metabolite of the 
Valium. (R. 253 at 132). Rasmussen testified that Valium is a tranquilizer known to 
cause impairment and that Lucido's levels were a little high for therapeutic. (R. 253 at 
133). She also testified that diazepam is a central nervous system depressant and as such 
it impairs reaction time, and that the levels of nordiazepam in Lucido's blood put it in the 
very high therapeutic range. (R. 253 at 133-34). Rasmussen further testified that 
hydrocodone is a synthetic opiate, the brand name is generally Lortab, that the level of 
0.1 microgram per mil is above therapeutic, and that it is a central nervous system 
depressant which causes impairment. (R. 253 at 134). Additionally, Rasmussen testified 
that all four drugs are central nervous system depressants and that a combination of the 
four is going to increase the potential for impairment. (R. 253 at 135). 
Most damaging, Rasmussen testified that "[gjiven a hypothetical that an individual 
had a severe automobile accident with these particular combination of drugs on board, it 
would be my belief that the drugs were a definite factor in the cause of the accident" and 
"[g]iven the high level of the drugs, the level of the hydrocodone in particular, because it 
is well above therapeutic, I can say definitely that yes, the drugs were a factor in the 
accident" and this despite "[e]ven given a high level of tolerance, given the level of 
hydrocodone, it is approaching a toxic level instead of simply a therapeutic." (R. 253 at 
143-44). 
It is difficult to asses how very damaging the above blood evidence and expert 
testimony in regards to said evidence was to Lucido's case. There should be no question 
that such evidence and testimony had a profound effect upon the deliberations of the jury, 
and that without said evidence and testimony, there is a reasonable probability that the 
jury would not have found him guilty of Driving Under the Influence of Drugs. 
Therefore, Lucido was prejudiced by trial counsel's waiver of the Fourth Amendment 
argument that said evidence should have been suppressed. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse Lucido's conviction for 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and remand to the trial court for the relief 
deemed appropriate by this Court. 
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home confinement if the person is determined to be 
indigent by the court. 
(e) The electronic monitoring described in this section 
may either be administered directly by the appropriate 
corrections agency, probation monitoring agency, or by 
contract with a private provider. 
(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall cover the 
costs of waivers by the court under Subsection (13)(d)(iv). 
(14) (a) If supervised probation is ordered under Section 
41-6-44.6 or Subsection (4)(e) or (5)(e): 
(i) the court shall specify the period of the proba-
tion; 
(ii) the person shall pay all of the costs of the 
probation; and 
(iii) the court may order any other conditions of the 
probation. 
(b) The court shall provide the probation described in 
this section by contract with a probation monitoring 
agency or a private probation provider. 
(c) The probation provider described in Subsection 
(14)(b) shall monitor the person's compliance with all 
conditions of the person's sentence, conditions of proba-
tion, and court orders received under this article and shall 
notify the court of any failure to comply with or complete 
tha t sentence or those conditions or orders. 
(d) (i) The court may waive all or part of the costs 
associated with probation if the person is determined 
to be indigent by the court. 
(ii) The probation provider described in Subsection 
(14)(b) shall cover the costs of waivers by the court 
under Subsection (14)(d)(i). 
(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) 
and there is admissible evidence tha t the person had a blood 
alcohol level of .16 or higher, the court shall order the 
following, or describe on record why the order or orders are not 
appropriate: 
(a) t reatment as described under Subsection (4)(d), 
(5)(d), or (6)(d); 'and 
(b) one or both of the following: 
(i) the installation of an ignition interlock system 
as a condition of probation for the person in accor-
dance with Section 41-6-44.7; or 
(ii) the imposition of home confinement through 
the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with 
Subsection (13). 2004 
41-6-44.1. Procedures —Adjudica t ive proceedings . 
The Department of Pubhc Safety shall comply with the 
procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its 
adjudicative proceedings. 1987 
41-6-44.2. Repealed. 1983 
41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical b r e a t h or oral fluids 
analysis — Evidence. 
(1) The Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety 
shall establish standards for the administration and interpre-
tation of chemical analysis of a person's brea th or oral fluids, 
including standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to 
prove tha t a person was operating or in actual physical control 
of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or 
operating with a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily 
prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of 
acts, conditions, or events to prove tha t the analysis was made 
and the instrument used was accurate, according to s tandards 
established in Subsection (1), are admissible if: 
(a) the judge finds tha t they were made in the regular 
course of the investigation at or about the time of the act, 
condition, or event; and 
(b) the source of information from which made and the 
method and circumstances of their preparation indicate 
their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds tha t the standards established under 
Subsection (1) and the conditions of Subsection (2) have been 
met, there is a presumption that the test results are valid and 
further foundation for introduction of the evidence is unnec-
essary. 2004 
41-6-44.4. Renumbered as § 53-3-231. i996 
41-6-44.5. Admissibi l i ty of chemical test results in ac-
t ions for driving under the influence — 
Weight of evidence. 
(1) (a) In any civil or criminal action or proceeding in which 
it is material to prove that a person was operating or in 
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs or with a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, the results of a 
chemical test or tests as authorized in Section 41-6-44.10 
are admissible as evidence. 
(b) In a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with Sec-
tion 41-6-44.10 does not render the results of a chemical 
test inadmissible. Evidence of a defendant's blood or 
breath alcohol content or drug content is admissible 
except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the 
constitution. 
(2) This section does not prevent a court from receiving 
otherwise admissible evidence as to a defendant's blood or 
breath alcohol level or drug level at the time relevant to the 
alleged offense. 2002 
41-6-44.6. Definit ions — Driving with any measurable 
control led substance in the body — Penalties 
— Arrest wi thout warrant. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Controlled substance" means any substance sched-
uled under Section 58-37-4. 
(b) "Practitioner" has the same meaning as provided in 
Section 58-37-2. 
(c) "Prescribe" has the same meaning as provided in 
Section 58-37-2. 
(d) "Prescription" has the same meaning as provided in 
Section 58-37-2. 
(2) In cases not amounting to a violation of Section 41-6-44, 
a person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle within this state if the person has any measur-
able controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled sub-
stance in the person's body 
(3) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this 
section that the controlled substance was involuntarily in-
gested by the accused or prescribed by a practitioner for use by 
the accused. 
(4) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(5) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person 
for a violation of this section when the officer has probable 
cause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in the 
officer's presence, and if the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
(6) The Driver License Division shall: 
(a) suspend, for 90 days, the driver license of a person 
convicted under Subsection (2); 
(b) revoke, for one year, the driver license of a person 
convicted of a second or subsequent offense under Subsec-
tion (2) or if the person has a prior conviction as defined 
under Subsection 41-6-44(1), if the violation is committed 
within a period of ten years after the date of the prior 
violation; and 
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(b) (i) To the extent t ha t an employer-owned motor 
vehicle is made available to a probationer subject to 
this section for pe r sona l i se , no exemption under this 
section shall apply. 
(ii) A probationer intending to operate an em-
ployer-owned motor vehicle for personal use and who 
is restricted to the operation of a motor vehicle 
equipped with an ignition interlock system shall 
notify the employer and obtain consent in writing 
from the employer to install a system in the em-
ployer-owned motor vehicle. 
(c) A motor vehicle owned by a business entity tha t is 
all or partly owned or controlled by a probationer subject 
to this section is not a motor vehicle owned by the 
employer and does not qualify for an exemption under 
this Subsection (8). 
(9) Upon conviction for violation of this section, the court 
shall notify the Driver License Division,to immediately- sus-
pend the probationer's license to operate a motor vehicle for 
the remainder of the period of probation. 
(10) (a) It is a class B misdemeanor for a person to: 
(i) circumvent or tamper with the operation of an 
ignition interlock system; 
(ii) knowingly furnish a motor vehicle without an 
ignition interlock system to someone who is not 
authorized to drive a motor vehicle unless the motor 
vehicle is equipped with an ignition interlock system 
tha t is in working order; 
(iii) rent, lease, or borrow a motor vehicle without 
an ignition interlock system if a driving restriction is 
imposed under this section; 
(iv) request another person to blow into an ignition 
interlock system, if the person is required to have a 
system and the person requests or solicits another to 
blow into the system to s tar t the motor vehicle in 
order to circumvent the system; 
(v) blow into an ignition interlock system or s tar t a 
motor vehicle equipped with an ignition interlock 
system for the purpose of providing an operable 
motor vehicle to another person required to have a 
system; 
(vi) advertise for sale, offer for sale, sell, or lease 
an ignition interlock system unless the system has 
been certified by the commissioner and the manufac-
turer of the system has affixed a warning label, as 
approved by the commissioner on the system, stating 
tha t the tampering, circumventing, or other misuse of 
the system is a class B misdemeanor; or 
(vii) operate a motor vehicle in violation of any 
ignition interlock restriction, 
(b) This Subsection (10) does not apply if the starting of 
a motor vehicle, or the request to s tar t a motor vehicle, 
equipped with an ignition interlock system is done for the 
purpose of safety or mechanical repair of the system or 
the motor vehicle and the person subject to the court order 
does not drive the motor vehicle. 
(11) (a ) ' In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, U tah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act, the commissioner shall 
make rules setting standards for the certification of igni-
tion interlock systems. 
(b) The standards shall require tha t the system: 
(i) not impede the safe operation of the motor 
vehicle; 
(ii) have features tha t make circumventing diffi-
cult and tha t do not interfere with the normal use of 
the motor vehicle; 
(iii) require a deep lung breath sample as a mea-
sure of breath alcohol concentration; 
(iv) prevent the motor vehicle from being started if 
the driver's breath alcohol concentration exceeds an 
ordered level; 
(v) work accurately and reliably in an unsuper-
vised environment; 
(vi) resist tampering and give evidence if tamper-
ing is attempted; 
(vii) operate reliably over the range of motor vehi-
cle environments; and 
(viii) be manufactured by a party who will provide 
liability insurance. 
(c) The commissioner may adopt in whole or in part, 
the guidelines, rules, studies, or independent laboratory 
tests relied upon in certification of ignition interlock 
systems by other states. 
(d) A fist of certified systems shall be published by the 
commissioner and the cost of certification shall be borne 
by the manufacturers or dealers of ignition interlock 
systems seeking to sell, offer for sale, or lease the systems. 
(e) In accordance with Section 63-38-3.2, the commis-
sioner may establish an annual dollar assessment against 
the manufacturers of ignition interlock systems distrib-
uted in the state for the costs incurred in certifying. The 
assessment shall be apportioned among the manufactur-
ers on a fair and reasonable basis. 
(12) There shall be no liability on the part of, and no cause 
of action of any na ture shall arise against, the state or its 
employees in connection with the installation, use, operation, 
maintenance, or supervision of an interlock ignition system as 
required under this section. 2001 
41-6-44.8. Municipal at torneys for specified offenses 
may prosecute for certain DUI offenses and 
driving w h i l e l i cense is suspended or re-
voked. 
The following class A misdemeanors may be prosecuted by 
attorneys of cities and towns, as well as by prosecutors 
authorized elsewhere in this code to prosecute these alleged 
violations: 
(1) alleged class A misdemeanor violations of Section 
41-6-44; and • • • , 
(2) alleged violations of Section 53-3-227, which consist 
of the person operating a vehicle while the person's 
driving privilege is suspended or revoked for a violation of 
Section 41-6-44, a local ordinance which complies with the 
requirements of Section 41-6-43, Section 41-6-44.10, Sec-
tion 76-5-207, or a criminal prohibition that the person 
was charged with violating as a result of a plea bargain 
after having been originally charged with violating one or 
more of those sections or ordinances. 1996 
41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alco-
hol or drug — Number of tes ts — Refusal — 
Warning, report — Hearing, revocation of li-
cense —Appeal — Person incapable of refusal 
— Results of test available — Who may give 
test — Evidence . 
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is 
considered to have given the person's consent to a chem-
ical test or tests of the person's breath, blood, urine, or 
oral fluids for the purpose of determining whether the 
person was operating or in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol 
content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44, 53-
3-231, or 53-3-232, while under the influence-of alcohol, 
any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under 
Section 41-6-44, or while having any measurable con-
trolled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance 
in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, if the 
test is or tests are administered at the direction of a peace 
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officer having grounds to believe that person to have been 
operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily 
prohibited under Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, 
or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-
44, or while having any measurable controlled substance 
or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's 
body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6. 
(b) (i) The peace officer determines which of the tests 
are administered and how many of them are admiri-
istered. 
(ii) If a peace officer requests more than one test, 
refusal by a person to take one or more requested 
tests , even though the person does submit to any 
other requested test or tests, is a refusal under this 
section. 
(c) (i) A person who has been requested under this 
section to submit to a chemical test or tests of the 
person's breath, blood, or urine, or oral fluids may not 
select the test or tests to be administered. 
(ii) The failure or inability of a peace officer to 
arrange for any specific chemical test is not a defense 
to taking a test requested by a peace officer, and it is 
not a defense in any criminal, civil, or administrative 
proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit 
to the requested test or tests. 
2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then 
been requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or 
more of the chemical tests under Subsection (1), and 
refuses to submit to any chemical test requested, the 
person shall be warned by the peace officer requesting the 
test or tests tha t a refusal to submit to the test or tests can 
result in revocation of the person's license to operate a 
motor vehicle. 
(b) Following the warning under Subsection (2)(a), if 
the person does not immediately request that the chemi-
cal test or tests as offered by a peace officer be adminis-
tered, a peace officer shall, on behalf of the Driver License 
Division and within 24 hours of the arrest, give notice of 
the Driver License Division's intention to revoke the 
person's privilege or license to operate a motor vehicle. 
When a peace officer gives the notice on behalf of the 
Driver License Division, the peace officer shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if 
any, of the operator; 
(ii) issue a temporary hcense certificate effective 
for only 29 days from the date of arrest; and 
(iii) supply to the operator, in a manner specified 
by the Driver License Division, basic information 
regarding how to obtain a hearing before the Driver 
License Division. 
(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if provided 
in a manner specified by the Driver License Division, also 
serve as the temporary hcense certificate. 
(d) As a matter of procedure, the peace officer shall 
submit a signed report, within ten calendar days after the 
day on which notice is provided under Subsection (2)(b), 
that the peace officer had grounds to believe the arrested 
person had been operating or was in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-
44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, or while under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug 
under Section 41-6-44, or while having any measurable 
controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled sub-
stance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-
44 fi anrl tha t the nerson had refused to submit to a 
(e) (i) A person who has been notified of the Driver 
License Division's intention to revoke the person's 
license under this section is entitled to a hearing. 
(ii) A request for the hearing shall be made in 
writing within ten calendar days after the day on 
which notice is provided. 
(iii) Upon request in a manner specified by the 
Driver License Division, the Driver License Division 
shall grant to the person an opportunity to be heard 
within 29 days after the date of arrest. 
(iv) If the person does not make a request for a 
hearing before the Driver License Division under this 
Subsection (2)(e), the person's privilege to operate a 
motor vehicle in the state is revoked beginning on the 
30th day after the date of arrest for a period of: 
(A) 18 months unless Subsection (2)(e)(iv)(B) 
applies; or 
(B) 24 months if the person has had a previ-
ous: 
(I) license sanction for an offense tha t 
occurred within the previous ten years from 
the date of arrest under this section, Section 
41-6-44.6, 53-3-223, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232; or 
(II) conviction for an offense tha t occurred 
within the previous ten years from the date 
of arrest under Section 41-6-44. 
(f) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(f)(ii), if a 
hearing is requested by the person, the hearing shall 
be conducted by the Driver License Division in the 
county in which the offense occurred. 
(ii) The Driver License Division may hold a hear-
ing in some other county if the Driver License Divi-
sion and the person both agree. 
(g) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover 
the issues of: 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds 
to believe that a person was operating a motor vehicle 
in violation of Section 41-6-44, 41-6-44.6, or 53-3-231; 
and 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the 
test, 
(h) (i) In connection with the hearing, the division or 
its authorized agent: 
(A) may administer oaths and may issue sub-
poenas for the attendance of witnesses and the 
production of relevant books and papers; and 
(B) shall issue subpoenas for the attendance of 
necessary peace officers. 
(ii) The Driver License Division shall pay witness 
fees and mileage from the Transportation Fund in 
accordance with the rates established in Section 
78-46-28. 
(i) If after a hearing, the Driver License Division deter-
mines that the person was requested to submit to a 
chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test or 
tests, or if the person fails to appear before the Driver 
License Division as required in the notice, the Driver 
License Division shall revoke the person's hcense or 
permit to operate a motor vehicle in U tah beginning on 
the date the hearing is held for a period of: 
(i) (A) 18 months unless Subsection (2)(i)(i)(B) ap-
plies; or 
(B) 24 months if the person has had a previ-
ous: 
(I) Hcense sanction for an offense tha t 
occurred within the previous ten years from 
the date of arrest under this section, Section 
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(II) conviction for an offense that occurred 
within the previous ten years from the date 
of arrest under Section 41-6-44. ^ 
(ii) The Driver License Division shall also assess 
against the person, in addition to any fee imposed 
under Subsection 53-3-205(13), a fee under Section 
53-3-105, which shall be paid before the person's 
driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administra-
tive costs. 
(hi) The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains 
an unappealed court decision following a proceeding 
allowed under this Subsection (2) tha t the revocation 
was improper, 
(j) (i) Any person whose license has been revoked by 
the Driver License Division under this section may 
seek judicial review. 
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative 
proceeding is a trial. Venue is in the district court in 
the county in which the offense occurred. 
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other 
condition rendering the person incapable of refusal to submit 
to any chemical test or tests is considered to not have 
withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1), and the 
test or tests may be administered whether the person has been 
arrested or not. 
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the 
results of the test or tests shall be made available to the 
person. 
(5) (a) Only a physician,, registered nurse, practical nurse, 
or person authorized under Section 26-1-30, acting at the 
request of a peace officer, may withdraw blood to deter-
mine the alcoholic or drug content. This limitation does 
not apply to taking a urine, breath, or oral fluid specimen. 
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or 
person authorized under Section 26-1-30 who, at the 
direction of a peace officer, draws a sample of blood from 
any person whom a peace officer has reason to believe is 
driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical 
facility at which the sample is drawn, is immune from any 
civil or criminal liability arising from drawing the sample, 
if the test is administered according to standard medical 
practice. 
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, a t the person's own 
expense, have a physician of the person's own choice 
administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests 
administered at the direction of a peace officer. 
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test 
does not affect admissibility of the results of the test or 
tests taken at the direction of a peace officer, or preclude 
or delay the test or tests to be taken at the direction of a 
peace officer. 
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test 
or tests administered at the direction of a peace officer. 
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a 
chemical test or tests, the person to be tested does not have the 
right to consult an attorney or have an attorney, physician, or 
other person present as a condition for the taking of any test. 
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical 
test or tests or any additional tes t under this section, evidence 
of any refusal is admissible in any civil or criminal action or 
proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed 
while the person was operating or in actual physical control of 
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, 
combination of alcohol and any drug, or while having any 
measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled 
substance in the person's body. 2004 
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41-6-44.12. Report ing test results — Immunity from 
liability. 
(1) As used in this section, '"health care provider" means a 
person licensed under Title 58, Chapter 31b, Nurse Practice 
Act, Title 58, Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice Act, or Title 
58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical Practice Act. 
(2) A health care provider who is providing medical care to 
any person involved in a motor vehicle crash may notify, as 
soon as reasonably possible, the nearest peace officer or law 
enforcement agency if the health care provider has reason to 
believe, as a result of any test performed in the course of 
medical t reatment, that the: 
(a) person's blood alcohol concentration meets or ex-
ceeds the limits under Subsection 41-6-44(2)(a); 
(b) person is younger than 21 years of age and has any 
measurable blood, breath, or urine alcohol concentration 
in the person's body; or 
(c) person has any measurable controlled substance or 
metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body 
which could be a violation of Subsection 41-6-44(2)(a)(ii) 
or Section 41-6-44.6. 
(3) The report under Subsection (2) shall consist of the: 
(a) name of the person being treated; 
(b) date and time of the administration of the test, and 
(c) results disclosed by the test. 
(4) A health care provider participating in good faith in 
making a report or assisting an investigator from a law 
enforcement agency pursuant to this section is immune from 
any liabihty, civil or criminal, tha t otherwise might result by 
reason of those actions. 
(5) A report under Subsection (2) may not be used to 
support a finding of probable cause that a person who is not a 
driver of a vehicle has committed an offense. 2004 
41-6-44.20. Drinking alcoholic beverage and open con-
tainers in motor vehicle prohibited — Defini-
t ions — Exceptions. 
(1) A person may not drink any alcohohc beverage while 
operating a motor vehicle or while a passenger in a motor 
vehicle, whether the vehicle is moving, stopped, or parked on 
any highway. 
(2) A person may not keep, carry, possess, transport, or 
allow another to keep, carry, possess, or transport in the 
passenger compartment of a motor vehicle, when the vehicle is 
on any highway, any container which contains any alcoholic 
beverage if the container has been opened, its seal broken, or 
the contents of the container partially consumed. 
(3) In this section: 
(a) "Alcohohc beverage" has the meaning given in Sec-
tion 32A-1-105. 
(b) "Chartered bus" has the meaning given in Section 
32A-1-105. 
(c) "Limousine" has the meaning given in Section 32A-
1-105. 
(d) "Passenger compartment" means the area of the 
vehicle normally occupied by the operator and passengers 
and includes areas accessible to them while traveling, 
such as a utility or glove compartment, but does not 
include a separate front or rear t runk compartment or 
other area of the vehicle not accessible to the operator or 
passengers while inside the vehicle. 
(4) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to passengers in the 
living quarters of a motor home or camper. 
(5) Subsection (2) does not apply to passengers traveling in 
any licensed taxicab or bus. 
(6) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to passengers who 
have carried their own alcohohc beverage onto a hmousine or 
chartered bus tha t is in compliance with Subsections 32A-12-
213(3)(b) and (c). 
